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International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for 
Regulatory Reform? 
David A. Wirth t 
The difficulties encountered in meshing obligations containedl 
in international agreements with domestic law and policy have 
been a recurring theme in United States foreign relations. Thie: 
leitmotif has recently resurfaced in the context of internationall 
trade agreements, especially as those instruments interact with 
other social welfare goals such as labor rights and environmentall 
quality. At the same time, there has been continuing attention to 
the potential for improving the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, andl 
efficacy of federal regulation, particularly in the environmental 
field. This Article clarifies the relationship between these two 
major strains of policy debate, examines the effect of internation·· 
al trade agreements on domestic environmental regulation, 
analyzes the impact of international trade law on domestie 
questions of process and governance, and evaluates the extent to 
which international trade agreements might serve as suitablE~ 
vehicles for regulatory reform. 
International agreements generally have received a great 
deal of attention for their capacity to facilitate multilateraJ 
cooperation on such environmental problems as stratospheric 
ozone depletion, climate disruption, species loss, and transnation-
al shipments of wastes, pesticides, and hazardous chemicals. 
Much of that discussion has emphasized how international 
agreements can overcome institutional and structural impedi· 
ments to achieving critical environmental goals. Multilateral 
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agreements can lead to effective international structures that 
. advance environmental priorities while meeting the needs of all 
states. 
With a few exceptions, 1 multilateral environmental agree-
ments have received considerably less attention than domestic 
statutes and regulations by reference to such tests as cost-benefit 
balancing and scientific integrity, which have been so prominent 
on the domestic level in the public policy disctission over regula-
tory reform. Rather, if the frequently major hurdle of generating 
sufficient political will behind a multilateral policy consensus can 
be surmounted, there is often general relief and little scrutiny of 
the adequacy or rationality of the actual obligations from either a 
scientific or economic point of view. For example, a 1985 Europe-
an agreement on acid rain mandated a uniform 30 percent 
reduction in. emissions of sulfur compounds as a principal way to 
combat acid rain.2 Economists would likely respond that this flat 
percentage reduction obligation for individual countries is eco-
nomically inefficient because some countries can make reductions 
at a lower cost than others. Some countries, moreover, already 
may have reduced emissions when the agreement enters into 
force, while others may not. An ecologist would likely observe 
that the flat percentage reduction approach is not necessarily the 
most scientifically desirable because it fails to consider that 
emissions from some sources may affect the environment more 
significantly than do others. For example, some emissions may 
blow out to sea without causing any appreciable environmental 
harm.3 
As the international colloquy over environmental and public 
health hazards reaches an increasingly higher level of sophistica-
tion, one might expect questions of economic efficiency and 
scientific integrity to acquire greater prominence in multilateral 
forums devoted to addressing those risks. While such an agenda 
1 See, for example, Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How 
Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U Chi Legal F 293. 
2 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least Thirty Per 
Cent, July 8, 1985, 27 ILM 698, 707 (1988). 
3 See, for example, Amy A. Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 Harv Intl L J 447, 
459 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of linking specific emissions with damage). Many of 
these concerns have been addressed in a "second cut" at this issue in the form of a subse-
quent agreement. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution on Further Reductions of Sulfur Emissions, June 14, 1994, 33 ILM 1640 (1994). 
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is already very much in evidence, it has appeared in an entirely 
different setting, namely that of international trade agreements. · 
At first blush, international trade agreements, as opposed to 
multilateral environmental treaties, might be considered good 
candidates for facilitating deregulation at the domestic level. 
Modem international trade agreements, such as the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the auspices of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")4 and . the 
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),6 address 
environmental matters expressly or implicitly. The primary pur-
pose of these instruments, however, is not to develop minimum 
environmental regulatory standards but to assure open access to 
global markets, a freer movement of goods, and, more generally, 
the dissemination of free market principles. These agreements 
equate liberalized trade with the absence of governmental inter-
vention in the marketplace through tariffs, subsidies, prescriptive 
regulations, and the like. Particularly since World War II, the 
overarching goal of the international trade regime has been to 
liberalize trade by systematically eliminating governmental mea-
sures such as tariffs. The history of GATr and, more generally, 
the multilateral trade regime exhibits incremental though steady 
progress toward extending this effort to include not only tariffs 
but export subsidies and non-tariff barriers. Indeed, the efficacy 
of the international . trade regime can be largely explained by the 
simplicity of the central message that the way to promote liber-
alized trade is to constrain governmental interVentions that per-
turb the international marketplace. 
From that perspective, environmental regulation is by defini-
tion a subcategory of governmentally established requirements 
that may act as barriers to international trade. The operative 
structure of international trade agreements mirrors this view-
point by articulating "negative" obligations in which states party 
to the instrument agree to refrain from certain actions such as 
unjustified regulatory requirements. For· example, the tests of 
scientific validity found in recent international trade agreements 
are intended to circumscribe the regulatory authority of national 
governments and consequently to limit the abuse of putatively 
• Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1, 33 
ILM 1125 (1994) ("Final Act"). 
• North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993) 
("NAFI'A"). 
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scientific claims for protectionist purposes, not to establish mini-
mum protections for the environment and for public health. Un-
like international trade agreements, international and domestic 
environmental programs anticipate and require the implemen-
tation of affirmative governmental actions. Indeed, this funda-
mental tension encapsulates the recent clash between trade arid 
environment, as evidenced by the conflict between the "negative" 
obligations in trade agreements and the prophylactic governmen-
tal action required to ensure environmental quality. One re-
gime-the environment-is designed to facilitate the implementa-
tion of affirmative governmental measures, and the oth-
er-trade-is intended to ensure the absence of such measures.6 
This approach of constraining governmental authority is 
remarkably similar to that of recent regulatory refonn proposals, 
including the House Republicans' Contract with America7 as well 
as subsequent unsuccessful legislative initiatives of the 104th 
Congress.8 Depending on one's point of view, international trade 
agreements represent either an opportunity or a temptation to 
accomplish substantive goals similar to those in the domestic 
regulatory refonn debate through international processes in the 
face of domestic obstacles to achieving those same aims at the 
national level. 
This Article examines the extent to which trade agreements 
such as NAFTA or the GATT/World Trade Organization ("WTO") 
regime of agreements and rules are appropriate vehicles for en-
couraging or requiring domestic regulatory refonn in the United 
States. To that end, the Article assesses the capacity of interna-
tional trade agreements to foster scientific integrity and the eco-
nomic efficiency of domestic regulation. Second, the Article evalu-
ates international trade agreements in the context of domestic 
process and governance, including (1) the role of private stan-
dard-setting processes; (2) legislative procedures, in particular 
the "fast track" process; (3) administrative procedure, especially 
ex parte communications; (4) judicial review; and (5) the distribu-
6 Compare Sanford E. Gaines, &thinking Environmental Protection, Competitive· 
ness, and International Trade, 1997 U Chi Legal F 231. 
7 Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds, Contract with America: The Bold Plan by 
Representative Newt Gingrich, Representative Dick Armey, and the House &publicans to 
Change the Nation (Random House 1994). 
6 See, for example, Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th 
Cong, 1st Seas (Feb 2, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 1711 (Jan 27, 1995). See also John D. 
Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less Cost, 
1997 U Chi Legal F 13, 56-58. 
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tion of regulatory authority between federal and state govern-
ments. Finally, the Article addresses question of international 
governance, including public participation in negotiating interna-
tional trade agreements and the settlement of disputes under 
them. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATORY REFORM 
Recent proposals for regulatory reform stress both scientific 
integrity, especially as measured by quantitative risk assessment 
techniques, and economic efficiency, as established through cost-
benefit analysis, as principal touchstones for the legitimacy of 
environmental and public health regulation.9 While the basic 
GA'IT obligations, often known as "disciplines," share the same 
purpose of constraining governmental abuses, they track this 
agenda poorly, if at all. There is considerable potential for a seri-
ous mismatch between, on the one hand, domestic measures 
based on sophisticated scientific assessments and, on the other 
hand, international trade rules based on simplistic tests of ques-
tionable integrity. 
Fundamental GA'ITIWTO obligations that apply to environ-
mental and public health regulation, as in other areas, include 
the most-favored-nation ("MFN") principle, 10 specifying non-dis-
crimination among imported products on the basis of their na-
tional origin, and national treatment, 11 a complementary re-
quirement for non-discrimination between foreign and domestic 
products. A third fundamental GA'ITIWTO discipline is a prohibi-
9 For example, according to the House Republicans' Contract with America: 
Congress is never forced to ensure that the benefits of regulation, better 
health and productivity, outweigh the costs, lost jobs, and lower wages. Nor does 
Congress pursue integrated health and safety goals. Instead, Congress and fed-
eral regulators often attack whatever health risk has caught the public's atten-
tion, even if its regulatory solution exacerbates other health risks. 
The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act [proposed in the Contract] 
requires each federal agency to assess the risks to human health and safety and 
the environment for each new regulation. Agencies must also provide the cost 
associated with the regulation and an analysis comparing the economic and 
compliance costs of the regulation to the public. Each agency must form an inde-
pendent peer review panel to certify the assessment and incorporate the best 
available scientific data. The review panel members must either possess pro-
fessional experience conducting risk assessment or in the given field of study 
[sic]. 
Gillespie and Schellhas, eds, Contract With America at 131-32. (cited in note 7). 
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct 30, 1947, Art I, 55 UNTS 188 (1950). 
II Id, Art III. . 
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tion on quantitative restrictions for imports or exports.12 This 
requirement can be seen as something of a corollary to the basic 
national treatment obligation, clarifying that numerical limita-
tions are not available as a way of discriminating between im-
ported and domestic goods. Taken in its entirety, the basic strate-
gy might be taken as a sort of "equal protection clause" for for-
eign and domestic goods, specifying treatment of foreign goods on 
the same footing as domestic ones and prohibiting discrimination 
among various foreign sources. 
These three fundamental GATTIWTO disciplines address the 
coverage of governmental activities without paying much atten-
tion to their content. For example, a state with a substantively 
absurd policy will satisfy these tests as long as it treats imports 
from all sources no worse than it treats the same products manu-
factured domestically. Compared with modem environmental 
law, these basic requirements or disciplines are also quite an-
cient. For instance, MFN clauses were well established as stan-
dard components in bilateral trade agreements by the mid-nine-
teenth century, at the latest. 
The GATT specifically addresses environmental and public 
health regulation only in Article XX, which exempts several cate-
gories of national measures from the General Agreement.13 Par-
ticularly important in the fields of environmental protection and 
public health are two of these express exceptions: one in para-
graph (b) for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health" and another in paragraph (g) for measures 
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption. "14 These "escape 
valves," however, have been interpreted rather restrictively.16 As 
12 ld, Art XI. 
13 ld, Art XX. 
1
' The relevant passage provides as follows: 
Article XX 
General E:cceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or urijustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement ·shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
. :. (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or] 
... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in cof'\iunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption. 
GAIT, Art XX (cited in note 10). 
10 See, for example, United States-Restrictions on Imports on Tuna, GATI BISD 39th 
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a result, environmental and public health regulation, until re-
cently, has tended to receive generic, one-size-fits-all treatment 
through application of the same basic GATT disciplines that 
would govern any international trade situation; few, if any, spe-
cial rules governing this particular class of governmentally estab-
lished measures have set out either more rigorous or less restric-
tive requirements. More recently, as the overall water level on 
the sea qf international trade has dropped through progress on 
other impediments such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers such a:~ 
environmental regulations have been perceived as increasingly 
significant outcroppings that impede navigation. Consequently, 
momentum has been increasing for the development of trade-
based disciplines to address regulatory measures in general and 
environmental requirements in particular. 
A. Scientific Integrity of Regulation 
To a large extent, an emphasis on the substantive scientifi·c 
integrity of environmental regulation has coincided with both the 
domestic regulatory reform debate and the negotiation of majo:r 
new trade agreements. As discussed above, the regulatory reform 
debate has recently focused on the scientific integrity of 
governmentally established standards and on the need for sound 
science in the regulatory process. Certain regulatory reform pro-
posals, for example, would use risk assessment techniques as a 
screening device to rationalize priorities in risk regulation and, in 
particular, to ensure that governmental resources and authority 
are directed toward substantial risks as opposed to small or trivi-
al ones. If anything, provisions in both the Uruguay Round 
agreements and NAFTA that require justifying food safety mea.-
sures with "sound science"16 are more aggressive than what has 
generally been accepted in the domestic regulatory reform de-
bate, judging by the failure of recent bills on this topic and by the 
overall paucity of such express requirements in existing environ-
mental and public health legislation. Both these international 
Supp 155 (1991), 30 ILM 1594, 1619 (Aug 16, 1991) (construing exceptions narrowly); 
Steve Chamovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, 4 Inti Envir Aff 203, 
211 (1992). 
15 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr 1!5, 
1994, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Urugull\y 
Round vol 27, 21895 ("SPS Agreement"); North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 
1992, Art 712.3, 32 ILM 289, 378 (1993) ("NAFTA"). 
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instruments require a risk assessment as a condition precedent 
to the validity of domestic food safety regulation.17 
The scientific validity of domestic environmental and public 
health regulations alleged to impede trade is now a front-burner 
public policy question. A festering trade dispute between the 
United States and the European Union ("EU") over hormone-
treated beef, a dispute emblematic of the larger public policy 
concern, is the subject of two recent reports of WTO dispute set-
tlement panels.18 The EU prohibits the use of six growth hor-
mones in the breeding of cattle, proscribes the sale of beef treat-
ed with those hormones, and bans the importation of such meat. 
The United States, where those hormones are permitted, has 
strongly objected to the ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade un-
supported by scientific evidence. The 199·~ :: ruguay Round 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, 19 which was motivated in large measure by this dis-
pute and which is designed to prevent the abuse of food safety 
measures as non-tariff barriers to trade, establishes new science-
based disciplines for food safety measures. 
The panels in the two beef hormone disputes found that the 
EU measures were inconsistent with the SPS agreement. Con-
trary to the expectations of the parties, 20 the panel directed de-
tailed scientific questions to six experts on the scientific issues 
raised by the disputes. 21 The panel went on to weigh the merits 
17 See note 16. 
18 United State&-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WTO Doc WT/DS26/RIUSA (Aug 18, 1997), reprinted at <www.unicc.org/wto>; Cana-
da-EC Measures Concerning . Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc 
WT/DS48/lUCAN (Aug 18, 1997), reprinted at <WWW.unicc.org/wto>. 
19 SPS Agreement (cited in note 16). 
20 See United State&-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
para 8. 7 (cited in note 18). 
21 See id § VI (panel's consultation with scientific experts, including experts' re-
sponses to written questions). The SPS agreement provides that national measures that 
conform to international standards, such as those established by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, are presumptively valid. SPS Agreement para 10 (cited in note 16). The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1962 as a joint undertaking of the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation ("FAO") and the World Health Organization ("WHO"). 
The Commission, membership in which is open to all FAO and WHO member states, has 
a dual function: "protecting the health of the [sic] consumers and ensuring fair practices 
in the food trade." Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, art 1, para a, re-
printed in Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual 5 (Joint FAOIWHO Food 
Standards Programme 9th ed 1993). To this end, the Commission is specifically charged 
with adopting advisory multilateral "good practice" standards on Ruch matters as the 
composition 'of food products, food additives, labeling, food processing techniques, and 
inspection of foodstuffs and processing facilities. See generally Lewis Rosman, Public 
Participation in International Pesticick Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decicks, 
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of the scientific evidence offered by the EU and concluded that it 
was insufficient to justify the hormone ban.22 Significantly, the 
SPS Agreement does not articulate any notion of deference to the 
scientific findings of national regulatory authorities23 and the 
panel did not purport to find any such notion implicit in the 
agreement. To the contrary, the panel expressly examined and 
reviewed the evidence proffered by the EU as the scientific justi-
fication for the measure, concluding that the EU's interpretations 
of the data represented minority views in the scientific commu-
nity and therefore were unavailable as support for the ban. 24 
Who Will Listen?, 12 Va Envir L J 329 (1993). After a lengthy and contentious debate, the 
Codex Commission, in 1995, adopted maximum residue limitations (MRLs), thus approv-
ing the use of two of the synthetic hormones at issue in this dispute, and concluded that 
no such limits were necessary for three of the hormones that occur naturally. See Foreign 
Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Chronology of the Europe· 
an Union's Hormone Ban (June 26, 1996). See also United States-EC Measures Concern-
ing Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) para 8.67 (cited in note 18) (noting that Codex 
action on the five hormones was taken by a vote of 33 to 29, with 7 abstentions). Despite 
the Codex Commission's involvement with the hormone issue in a manner that had legal 
significance in the outcome of the dispute, and notwithstanding the concerns of the EU, 
see id § 6, para 3, the panel nonetheless sought information from the Codex Commission 
secretariat and requested nominations of experts from the secretariat. Id paras 6-7. 
22 United States-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
para 8.134 (cited in note 19). The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement introduces the concept 
of a WTO memb41:r's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, which is a 
social policy choice that is the unilateral prerogative of each WTO member state. SPS 
Agreement para 10 (cited in note 16). If a WTO member state determines, as the EU did 
in this case, that harmonized international standards such as Codex MRLs are not 
adequate to achieve its chosen level of protection, then that state may adopt measures 
more stringent than international standards so long as those measures are supported by 
"a scientific justification." Id para 11. Instead of starting with the EU's appropriate level 
of protection-identified by the EU as "zero risk" for hazards arising from ingestion of 
hormones administered for growth promotion-the panel commenced by examining and 
rejecting the scientific evidence justifying the ban, arguably turning the review contem-
plated by the SPS agreement on its head. Consequently, the panel concluded that the ban 
was not "based on" the scientific evidence as required by the SPS Agreement, id para 6, 
and therefore not an appropriate regulatory measure to be employed to achieve the EU's 
stated policy goal. United States-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) para 8.156 (cited in note 18). The panel also found the "precautionary princi-
ple," which asserts the need for policy action in cases of scientific uncertainty, to be 
inapplicable. Id paras 7.146-7.147. See generally David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 Ga 
L I_Wv 599 (1994) (discussing precautionary approaches). 
23 Compare Stephen P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, 
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am J Inti L 193 (1996) 
(analyzing question of deference to national interpretations of GA'IT law by analogy to 
Chevron doctrine in U.S. domestic law). 
24 United States-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
paras 8.132-8.134 (cited in note 18). 
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The EU has appealed the panel decision to the WTO's Appellate 
Body. 
Quantitative risk assessment is not a purely technical exer-
cise; rather, it involves the application of policy preferences in 
the form of assumptions, extrapolation from animal data to hu-
mans and from high to low doses, management of incomplete 
data sets, and treatment of scientific uncertainties. Social policy 
choices are firmly embedded in much of the practice of risk as-
sessment methodologies.25 A recent publication of the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences implies as 
much: it advocates abandoning the artificial division between 
risk assessment and risk management on which the SPS Agree-
ment is based and replacing it with a more integrated concept of 
"risk characterization. "26 Quantitative risk assessment can be 
useful as one of a number of regulatory tools, but it is susceptible 
of abuse if applied in an excessively rigorous manner.27 This 
appears to have been one of the lessons of the 104th Congress, 
which introduced relatively aggressive proposals to deploy quan-
titative risk assessment in an excessively harsh manner. These 
proposals were perceived as overreaching by industry and were 
ultimately rejected as public policy, albeit by a narrow margin. 
Both the proposals for enhancing quantitative risk assess-
ment domestically and the emphasis on scientific disciplines in 
these recent international trade agreements anticipate the need 
to determine scientific validity in a particular case, such as the 
U.S.-E.U. beef hormone dispute. The role of judicial review of the 
scientific basis for regulation, traditionally an area of great defer-
ence,28 has been of particular concern in the domestic regulatory 
25 Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotwn, Su, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assess-
ment Battlefield, 1997 U Chi Legal F 59. 
26 National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Deciswns in a Demo-
cratic Society (NRC 1996). See generally David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the 
Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 Comelllntl L J 817 (1994) (discussing 
risk assessment/risk management distinction in context of SPS Agreement). 
27 David A. Wirth and Ellen K Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 Colum L Rev 1857, 1894 
(1995). 
25 In a seminal case involving precisely this question, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed as follows: 
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, 
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the 
regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that of an 
expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause 
and effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose 
of the statute is to be served. 
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reform colloquy. Internationally, the explicit risk assessment 
requirements in recent global trade agreements, particularly in 
the area of food safety, may be more consonant with an appropri-
ate role for methodology than is apparent from the unadorned 
Uruguay Round and NAFI'A texts. In response to questions 
about these requirements in the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, 
the Executive Branch has explained: 
It is clear that the requirement in the [SPS] Agreement 
that measures be based on scientific principles and not 
be maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence" 
would not authorize a dispute settlement panel to sub-
stitute its scientific judgment for that of the government 
maintaining the sanitary or phytosanitary measure. For 
example, by requiring that a measure be based on sci-
entific principles (rather than, for instance, requiring 
that a measure be based on the "best science") and not 
to be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence 
(rather than; for instance, requiring an examination of 
the "weight of the evidence"), the [SPS] Agreement 
recognizes the fact that scientific certainty is rare and 
many scientific determinations require a judgment 
among differing scientific views. The [SPS] Agreement 
preserves the ability of governments to make such judg-
ments.29 
It would be difficult to imagine a different outcome as a 
matter of principle. Before a trade agreement dispute settlement 
panel-the international analogue of domestic judicial re-
view-serious questions surround scientific deierminations in an 
adversarial, adjudicatory context, not only by lay panelists but 
Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 28 (DC Cir 1976) (en bane). Compare Portland Cement 
Assn v Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375 (DC Cir 1973) (new source performance standard for 
Portland cement plants invalidated after deferential review of substance of scientific is-
sues); International Harvester Co. v Ruckelshaus, 478 F2d 615 (DC Cir 1973) (denial of 
waiver for new motor vehicle emissions reduction standards invalidated after deferential 
review of substance of scientific issues). 
29 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, HR Doc No 
103-316, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 656, 746 (1994), reprinted in 1994 USCCAN 4040, 4105. See 
also Office of the United States Trade Representative, Report on U.S. Food Safety and the 
Uruguay Round: Protecting Consumers and Promcting U.S. Export 5 (June 1994). Com-
pare North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Statement of Adminis-
trative Action, HR Doc No 103-159, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 450, 542 (1993) ("[t]he question 
is . .. not whether the measure was based on the 'best' science or the 'preponderance' of 
science or whether there was conflicting science. The question is .only whether the govern-
ment maintaining the measure has a scientific basis for it." 
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also by scientific experts. Both the GATr Uruguay Round texts 
and NAFTA anticipate creating bodies of technical experts to 
assist dispute settlement panels composed of laypersons in situa-
tions that raise scientific questions such as the beef hormone 
controversy.30 Determining the appropriate role of such bodies, 
however, raises more questions than it answers. For instance, it 
is difficult for a trade agreement dispute settlement panel to pose 
questions to scientists without engaging with the social policy-
driven assumptions, hypotheses, and theories on which a risk as-
sessment is based.31 The notion of deference by one scientist to 
another's defensible, but arguably incorrect, scientific determina-
tion is not necessarily well internalized among the scientific com-
munity. The composition of these expert groups is obviously cru-
cial, but there is no requirement in the texts of the agreements 
that the members of such groups be broadly representative of the 
range of scientific thought on the questions posed. The very no-
tion of"representativeness" in scientific disciplines, which involve 
the systematic consideration and analysis of competing falsifiable 
hypotheses, raises conceptual difficulties. Nor, as demonstrated 
by the rejection of the notion of "science courts" in the 1970s, are 
scientific "facts" of relevance to regulatory decisions that are 
hotly contested or at the frontiers of scientific inquiry necessarily 
amenable to "adjudication" by scientists through an adversarial 
process.32 
Instead, the scientific method more typically relies on peer 
review, a more conciliatory process with a sometimes protracted 
give-and-take among experts. Significantly, scientific peer review 
does not anticipate the sort of bipolar, "yes or no" result contem-
plated by an adjudicatory process. Instead, the peer review pro-
cess is considerably more responsive to the inherent character of 
scientific inquiry-an ongoing search for knowledge, which by its 
30 Significantly, the scientific advice sought by the WTO panel in the beef hormone 
disputes was undertaken on an ad hoc basis and not through the mechanism of an "expert 
review group," as expressly anticipated by the Uruguay Round. See Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes para 13.2, 33 ILM 1226 
(1994) (specifying that, "[w]ith respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other 
technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in 
writing from an expert review group"). 
31 See, for example, United States-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts (Hormones) para 8.152 (cited in note 18) (noting that, according to scientific experts 
consulted by panel, science cannot exclude all possibility of adverse health effects and that 
therefore EU policy objective of "zero risk" is not based on risk assessment). 
32 Wirth, 27 Cornell Inti L J at 852 (cited in note 26). 
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very nature is always operating at new frontiers against a con-
stantly shifting and evolving background. 
Although better science is always preferable, it may not bE~ 
possible to reduce meaningful scientific distinctions to legal testn 
applied in the essentially adjudicatory setting of a dispute settle·· 
ment panel. And deploying science-based tests in the intema·· 
tional equivalent of a proceeding for judicial review may be so 
fraught with peril that the potential chilling effect on legitimatE~ 
domestic regulation will likely outweigh the benefits of increased 
market access. Most unfortunately, the panels in the WTO beef 
hormone disputes, which engaged in a highly intrusive review of 
the merits of the EU's scientific evidence in a manner that would! 
be well nigh unthinkable at the domestic level,33 appear to have 
appreciated none of these critical issues. A clarification from the 
WTO's Appellate Body on the crucial points of standard of review 
and deference to the scientific determinations of national deci·· 
sion-makers would not only be most welcome; establishing a. 
credible standard in this area is essential to the integrity of the: 
SPS Agreement and, more generally, the actual and perceived 
legitimacy of science-based tests in trade agreements, a trend. 
which will likely only intensify in the future. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Economic efficiency, as measured for a specific regulatory 
measure through cost-benefit analysis, has also been a potent 
theme in the domestic regulatory reform debate. In the trade 
agreement context, this issue is analogous to the question of 
scientific integrity, with the difference that it raises the question 
of trade-related disciplines in the risk management phase of the 
regulatory process instead of risk assessment.34 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, economic efficiency and cost-benefit analysis have had 
considerably less vigor as criteria imposed on national govern-
ments by international trade agreements than have tests of sci-
entific validity. 
There is no explicit language in GATr, the Uruguay Round 
texts, or NAFTA speaking to economic efficiency or a favorable 
balance of costs and benefits as conditions precedent under those 
agreements to the application of domestic regulatory measures. 
33 See notes 20-24. 
34 Wirth, 27 Cornell Inti L J 817 (cited in note 26) (discussing risk assessment/risk 
management distinction). 
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The closest example is the report of a dispute settlement panel 
convened under the auspices of the United States-Canada bilater-
al free trade agreement, a precursor to NAFTA. 36 At issue were 
Canadian regulations requiring that all commercial harvests of 
roe herring and five species of salmon caught commercially in 
Canadian waters, including that intended for export from Cana-
da, be off-loaded, or "landed," in Canadian territory. The panel 
concluded that the "landing" requirement constituted an imper-
missible export restriction contrary to GA'IT, the relevant provi-
sions of which are incorporated by reference into the bilateral 
agreement. 38 
The panel inferred an implicit test under GA'IT that' balanc-
es the costs and benefits of the challenged measure, taking into 
account the regulatory burdens to foreign commercial inter-
ests.37 According to the report, international trade agreement 
dispute settlement panels should assume that governments will 
act in a minimally rational economic manner, and those panels 
consequently may use a cost-benefit analysis as a criterion to 
reevaluate the desirability or utility of a disputed national regu-
latory requirement.38 Thus, the panel must determine "whether 
the government would have been prepared to adopt that measure 
if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the mea-
sure. "39 This aspect of the panel's decision has been criticized as 
an "idealistic but dubious proposition" and as "a mode of analysis 
so inherently subjective" that it "leaves environmental regula-
tions vulnerable to a broad array of challenges. "40 
The requirement at issue in the Canadian salmon and her-
ring dispute is representative of a very large class of regulatory 
measures which, while nondiscriminatory on their face, can none-
theless have disparate impacts on domestic and foreign interests 
when applied. Certainly, one can appreciate the panel's sensitivi-
ty to the problem of shifting regulatory burdens to foreigners who 
35 In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Her-
ring, Panel No CDA-89-1807-01, para 8.02 (October 16, 1989) ("Canada's Landing Require-
ment"). 
36 Id. 
37 Id paras 7.08-7.10. 
35 Id para 7.11. 
39 Canada's Landing Requirement para 7.09 (cited in note 35). 
40 Steve Chamovitz, Exploring the Environmental E:u:eptions in GAIT Article XX, 25 
J World Trade L 37, 50-51 (Oct 1991). But see C. Ford Runge, et al, Freer Trade, Pro-
tected Environment: Balancing Trade Liberalization and Environmental Interests 80-83 
(Council on Foreign Relations 1994) (citing with approval CFTA salmon and herring 
dispute settlement panel report). 
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are not represented in the political process that imposed those 
burdens. But a cost-benefit test of the sort articulated by this 
panel has been expressly rejected in much environmental regula-
tion, including a great deal of federal legislation in the United 
States, whose legitimacy from a trade perspective has never been 
challenged. Taken to its logical conclusion, the panel's approach 
could overlay a cost-benefit criterion on all environmental stan-
dards with incidental trade effects, a result that would clearly be 
an excessively sweeping and blunt-edged instrument.'u At ·pres-
ent, an economic efficiency or cost-benefit criterion, in contrast to 
an emphasis on scientific validity, appears to have little constitu-
ency in the international trade regime.42 Moreover, methodologi-
cal questions about the validity of cost-benefit analysis, particu-
larly about the measurement and quantification of environmental 
or public health benefits, are only exacerbated in international 
multilateral organizations such as the WTO that have limited ex-
perience with such matters. 43 
41 See Douglas J. Caldwell and David A Wirth, 'I'ratk and the Environment: Equilib-
rium or Imbalance?, 17 Mich J Inti L 563 (1996). 
42 International trade agreements and dispute settlement panels have articulated, 
variously, tests that turn on the least inconsistency with GATT or that require the choice 
of the least trade restrictive national measure. See, for example, Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Apr 15, 1994, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 1A. Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 27, 22051 ("TBT Agreement") (requiring that 
"technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legiti-
mate objective" and specifying that "[t}echnical regulations shall not be maintained ... 
if ... changed circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive 
manner"); United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 ILM 
603, 611 (1996) (report of WTO Appellate Body) (identification of failure "to explore ade-
quately means . . . of mitigating the administrative problems [justifying disparate 
treatment of domestic and foreign refiners} and to count the costs for foreign refiners that 
would result" as basis for conclusion of GAIT-inconsistency of measure); Thai-
land-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, paras 74-81, 
GATT BISD 37th Supp 200 (1991), 30 ILM 1122, 1138 (1991) (stating that import restric-
tions on cigarettes for public health reasons not justified by Article X:X(b) in light of avail-
ability of GAIT-consistent or less GAIT-inconsistent measures). While of significant con-
cern in the context of environmental, public health, and safety regulations, these tests are 
different in nature and intent from an economic efficiency criterion. One possible entry 
point for a cost-benefit test in the case of environmental regulation, as of this writing 
largely unexplored in GA TTIWTO jurisprudence, would be the req~rement in the 
'chapeau' of GATT Article XX making the exceptions in that provision unavailable in 
cases of "a disguised restriction on international trade." GATT, Art XX (cited in note 10). 
Compare Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT 48 n 15 (Institute for International Econom-
ics 1994) ("A 'least GAIT-inconsistent' or 'least trade-restrictive' test could work as an 
efficiency precept, forcing attention to the means chosen to pursue environmental goals, 
without threatening the goals chosen. Unfortunately, the GATT jurisprudence has devel-
oped without regard to this ends-means distinction .. . "). 
43 The relationship between GATT nondiscrimination requirements and cost-benefit 
analysis has been considered in some detail as a generic matter by one of the panelists in 
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II. DOMESTIC GoVERNANCE 
In addition to substantive questions, trade agreements also 
engage issues of governance concerning the manner in which 
such agreements affect domestic legal processes. 44 In the 
American dualist system, the international and domestic regimes 
are conceptually and legally distinct. 411 Accommodating one to 
the other can invite tradeoffs in the integrity of one or the other, 
or both. Among the principal concerns currently raised by the 
newly established WTO are ( 1) the role of vol~ntary international 
standard-setting processes; (2) the integrity of legislative process-
es for implementing trade agreements; (3) appropriate adminis-
trative procedures for implementing adverse reports of dispute 
settlement panels; ( 4) the role of judicial review of administrative 
actions that respond to adverse dispute settlement panel reports; 
and (5) the distribution of authority between federal authorities 
and subsidiary governmental units in our federal system. All of 
these subject matter areas entail serious policy questions con-
cerning the potential of domestic implementation of international 
trade agreements to disrupt domestic decision making processes, 
and a number raise analogous legal questions as well. Perhaps 
not coincidentally, all of them also involve a considerable aug-
mentation of Executive Branch power vis-a-vis the Congress, the 
federal courts, and the states. 
the Canadian salmon and herring dispute. Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, Free 
Trade and the Regulatory State: A GA1Ts-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 7 
Vand L Rev 1401, 1431-40 (1994). The authors note that, with respect to the large catego-
ry of non-facially discriminatory regulatory measures, 
[w]e have no •quick fix" to propose for the hard cases. We somewhat gingerly at-
tempted that task in an earlier version of this article, but are now convinced 
that the effort was misplaced. The general problem we are addressing has re-
sisted the best efforts of the Supreme Court (for over 150 years), GATT tribu-
nals, international negotiators, and a host of talented legal scholars. The reason, 
we believe, is that in some ultimate sense the problem is unsolvable. Taken to 
their logical conclusion, either free trade or local autonomy could virtually elimi-
nate the other .... 
Id at 1438. For an analysis questioning the analogy between the GATT and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, see David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the Munici-
pal Law of Federal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 1389 (1992). 
44 For another view of this question, see Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and Interna-
tional Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw J Inti L & Bus 681 (1996-97). 
46 For an interesting recent treatment with considerable relevance to the trade 
agreement setting, see Johnathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International 
Legisprudence, 44 Hastings L Rev 185 (1993). 
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A. Voluntary International Standard-Setting Processes 
A key emerging issue in negotiating and implementing inter-
national trade agreements concerns the role of voluntary interna-
tional standard-setting bodies, of which the quintessential exam-
ple is the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"). 
ISO, established after World War II around the same time as the 
GA'IT, is an international federation of standardizing bodies from 
118 countries. ISO is not an intergovernmental organization like 
the WTO, established by multilateral agreement with members 
that are states represented by governmental authorities. Some 
countries are represented in ISO by national standardizing bod-
ies that are governmental entities. The U.S. member of ISO, 
however, is the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), 
a private entity. For the United States, the primary, although not 
sole, participants in ISO processes are representatives of private 
industry. ISO work product consists of voluntary standards. In 
contrast to some of the output of intergovernmental organiza-
tions, ISO standards are voluntary, are addressed directly to 
private parties, and are not binding under international law. At 
least for the United States, the private, voluntary character of 
the international standards adopted by ISO mirrors similar do-
mestic undertakings. 46 
Although ISO standards are voluntary, they often have con-
siderable influence. Probably the best-known ISO standards are 
those established for film speeds. The public obviously· benefits 
from near-universal access to film with standardized speeds of 
100, 200, or 400 ASA that is compatible with essentially all cam-
eras. ISO recently adopted its 14000 series of standards, which 
emphasize a process-oriented approach to environmental man-
agement designed to "help an organization to establish and meet 
its own policy goals through objectives and targets, organization-
al structures and accountability, management controls and re-
view functions, all with top management oversight."47 Although 
46 See, for example, Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in 
the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tex L Rev 
1329 (1978). 
47 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ISO 14000: International Environmental 
Management Standards (EPA Standards Network Fact Sheet, May 1995). See Community 
Nutrition Institute, The ISO 14_000 Series: Private Voluntary Standards in an Internation-
al Trade and Environment Context (draft unpublished manuscript 1996); Joseph Cascio, 
ed, The ISO 14000 Handbook (ASQL Quality 1996); Tom Tibor with Ira Feldman, ISO 
14000: A Guide to the New Environmental Management Standards (Irwin 1996); Christo-
pher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of International Environmental Management Systems 
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"[t]he focus on 'management' distinguishes these standards from 
'performance' standards"48 of the sort typically found in federal 
law, a potential for overlap clearly exists. Ecolabelling and life-
cycle assessment are also among the topics addressed in the ISO 
14000 series of standards.49 
The municipal legal and policy implications of ISO standards 
inevitably vary from country to country. In the United States, 
federal officials are encouraged to participate in establishing 
voluntary consensus standards, which may then become appro-
priate candidates for binding regulatory requirements.60 At least 
under certain circumstances, such private efforts have many 
advantages. The cross-fertilization and coordination with govern-
mental policy that results from participation in these voluntary 
undertakings by federal officials is most likely beneficial, and 
private voluntary standards may occasionally be appropriate 
alternatives to mandatory, governmental regulation. For exam-
ple, a voluntary consensus process may generate better data than 
the regulatory process, may be an effective way to educate regu- · 
latory officials, and may obviate the need for regulatory interven-
tion altogether. 
Standards in the United States, 25 Envir L Rptr 10678 (1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shift-
ing the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and 
Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 Ecol L Q 479 (1995); John J. 
Audley, . Privatizing Public Regulations: The International Organization for 
Standardization 14000 Environmental Management Series (unpublished manuscript 
1996). 
48 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ISO 14000 (cited in note 47). 
•e See generally id. 
110 See, for example, National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
§ 12(d), Pub L No 104-113, 110 Stat 775, 783 (specifying that "all Federal agencies and 
departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary 
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy 
objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments" and that "Federal 
agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus stan-
dards bodies and shall . . . participate with such bodies in the development of technical 
standards"); Office of Management and Budget Circular No A-119, 58 Fed Reg 57643, 
57645 (Oct 26, 1993) (declaring "the policy of the Federal Gi>vernment in its procurement 
and regulatory activities to: a. Rely on voluntary standards, both domestic and interna-
tional, whenever feasible and consistent with the law and regulation pursuant to law; 
[and] b. Participate in voluntary standards bodies when such participation is in the public 
interest and is compatible with agencies' missions, authorities, priorities, and budget 
resources."); Office of Management and Budget, Federal Use of Standards, 61 Fed Reg 
68312 (Dec 27, 1996) (proposed revisions to OMB Circular A-119); Recommendation 78-4: 
Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-Setting Organization in Health and 
Safety Regulation, in Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendations 
and Reports 1978 13 (1978); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Role of Voluntary 
Standards (EPA Standards Network Fact Sheet, May 1995); Hamilton, 56 Tex L Rev 1329 
(cited in note 46). 
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But it is equally clear that a federal agency must abide by 
the statutory standards that govern its activities. Whatever their 
policy merits, domestic ISO standards are private, voluntary 
undertakings. Accordingly, federal agencies may use governmen-
tal standards adopted by a non-governmental entity such as ISO, 
regardless of the respect accorded such a body, only as hortatory 
guidance to be reevaluated in light of applicable statutory stan-
dards. 51 This result is self-evident, since ISO, whose members 
represent affected industries, does not necessarily represent the 
broader public interest. Indeed, one can imagine a scenario in 
which the array of interests that shape aJi industry-dominated, 
voluntary standard-setting processes are in direct conflict with 
the well being of the public both here and abroad. 
The benefits of voluntary standards for facilitating interna-
tional trade are readily apparent. As a result, one of the major 
Uruguay Round instruments, the new Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"),62 expressly references vol-
untary international standards. The TBT Agreement establishes 
that "standards," as the term is used in that text, may include 
voluntary guidelines adopted by an "international standardizing 
body," a term that appears to include IS0.53 Although standards 
adopted by ISO are non-binding instruments addressed directly 
to private entities, the TBT Agreement goes on to specify that 
governmentally established requirements, known in the agree-
ment as "technical regulations," shall be based on those stan-
61 See, for example, 58 Fed Reg at 57646-47 (cited in note 50) (explaining that the 
policy should not be "construed to commit any agency to the use of a voluntary standard 
which, after due consideration, is, in its opinion, inadequate, does not meet statutory 
criteria, or is otherwise inappropriate"); 61 Fed Reg 68312 (cited in note 50) (proposing 
revisions to OMB Circular A-119, para 6, clarifying that that proposal "does not preempt 
or restrict agencies' authorities and responsibilities to make regulatory decisions autho-
rized by statute. Such regulatory authorities and responsibilities include determining the 
level of acceptable risk; setting the level of protection; and balancing risk, cost, and avail-
ability of technology in establishing regulatory standards. Agencies retain discretion to 
decline to use existing voluntary consensus standards if the agency determines that such 
standards are inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise i.mpmctical"); Recommenda-
tion 78-4 pam 6(b) (cited in note 50) (necessity to consider "[t)h~ nature of the agency's 
statutory mandate to develop health or safety regulations and the consistency of the 
provisions of the voluntary consensus standard with that mandate"). 
52 TBT Agreement (cited in note 42). The TBT Agreement includes as an annex a 
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, which 
similarly refers to international standards. The Code of Good Practice, referenced in the 
text of the TBT Agreement with respect to the obligations of WTO member states, is also 
open for acceptance by national and regional standardizing bodies such as ANSI. 
63 Id para 1.1. 
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dards.64 Governmental regulations that conform to the stan-
dards adopted by such an international standardizing body are 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy.66 A wide 
range of regulatory requirements with environmental or public 
health implications, including specifications for consumer prod-
ucts and children's toys, appliance efficiency criteria, and vehicle 
fuel efficiency standards, are potentially covered by the Uruguay 
Round TBT Agreement. 
Thanks to the structure of the TBT Agreement, those nation-
al regulatory requirements that are not based on the output, 
when it exists, of such a body are therefore particularly vulnera-
ble to challenge as unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
And the sorts of governmental requirements most likely to im-
pede international trade are those that are more rigorous than 
the international requirements and which may stem from a least-
common-denominator consensus in an industry-dominated forum. 
As a result, trade agreements can transform the expectations of 
what is, at least so far as the United States is concerned, a pri-
vate standardizing organization into an outer limit of rigor-a 
ceiling-for public domestic health and environmental regula-
tions. Like all international trade agreements except one,66 the 
Uruguay Round TBT Agreement is asymmetric in that it estab-
lishes no analogous minimum standards of performance. 
At first blush, the requirements of the Uruguay Round TBT 
Agreement and of other trade agreements may appear similar to 
those in domestic law and policy, such as OMB Circular A-119, 
which promotes reliance on ISO standards to the extent consis-
tent with statutory mandates.67 In reality, however, the two sit-
64 ld para 2.4. 
56 An analogous passage in NAFTA sets out a similar approach. North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, Arts 905, 915, 32 ILM 289 (1993) ("NAFTA") (defining 
international standards as "a standards related measure, or other guide or recommenda-
tion, adopted by an international standardizing body and made available to the public."). 
Similarly, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr 15, 
1994, §§ 9-10, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex lA, Legal Instruments-Results of the 
Uruguay Round vol 27, 21895 ("SPS Agreement"), and parallel provisions ofNAFTA, Arts 
713, 724 (cited in note 55), reference international standards. 
56 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr 15, 
1994, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay 
Round vol 31, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) (establishing minimum standards of performance for 
national measures on intellectual property). See also NAFTA, Art 1114 (cited in note 55) 
(establishing that "it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic 
health, safety or environmental measures" but exempting provision from ordinary trade 
agreement dispute setUement mechanisms). 
67 58 Fed Reg 57643 (cited in note 50). 
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uations are very different. While authorizing consistency wher«~ 
possible with ISO standards as non-binding advisory guidelines, 
the OMB Circular, as it must, reasserts the primacy of congres·· 
sionally enacted legislative requirements.68 In a domestic pro·· 
ceeding for judicial review, a court as a matter of principle should 
apply the statutory test without regard to a privately agreed 
standard in a forum such as ISO. By contrast, these recent tradE! 
agreements establish the private standard as a reference point 
and require public authorities to justify departures from thosE! 
privately agreed expectations, especially departures tending to·· 
ward more rigorous requirements. This situation in effect boot·· 
straps a non-governmental standard into one with binding signif.. 
icance for governmentally established regulatory requirements, at 
least as a matter of international law. Departures from the 
benchmark standard by domestic regulatory authorities can then 
be challenged by foreign governments through the trade agree .. 
ment dispute settlement process, among the more efficaciouE~ 
known in the international legal system. In other words, when 
non-binding ISO standards operate through the TBT Agreement:, 
they may acquire international legal significance, may be 
transformed from minimum standards of performance into regu·· 
latory ceilings from which governments must justify departure in 
terms of greater rigor, and, at least from the U.S. point of view:, 
may metamorphose from strictly private, non-governmental in .. 
struments into standards with significant public law implica .. 
tions. 
The domestic impact within the United States may be con .. 
siderable. Adverse reports of trade agreement dispute settlement 
panels, like the agreements themselves, are binding on the Unit-
ed States as a matter of international law. While such reports do 
not alter domestic statutory or regulatory standards of their own 
force, they may have considerable legal impact in domestic ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings, as discussed in Parts C 
and D below. Moreover, through their implementing legislation, 
these trade agreements are treated as binding domestic law that 
may preempt state law. 
"Ecolabelling" is a concrete example of the potentially disrup-
tive effect of the ISO standard-setting process. Ecolabelling 
schemes are designed to help consumers make environmentally 
preferable product choices by comparing the relative environmen-
tal impact of competing products. Foreign ecolabels have been the 
"" Id. 
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subject of criticism from U.S. industry, which has asserted in 
particular that a governmentally sponsored, voluntary program 
currently being implemented by the European Union discrimi-
nates against U.S. exports.119 It is unclear whether the Uruguay 
Round TBT Agreement applies to all or even most ecolabelling 
programs60 or, even if such schemes were to fall within its pur-
view, whether that agreement effectively addresses the potential 
for protectionist abuse. Accordingly, U.S. industry provided the 
Executive Branch with a series of stringent new disciplines to 
present to the WTO. This proposal would have circumscribed not 
just the activities of governments and private parties in foreign 
countries, but also in the United States, including such govern-
mental programs as the Environmental Protection Agency's vol-
untary Energy Star logo for identifying energy-efficient personal 
computers and private certification schemes such as the non-
profit Green Seal.61 The Executive Branch declined to advocate 
these new requirements,62 which would have articulated a rigor-
ous standard of scientific proof in an area that involves, like risk 
assessment, a significant measure of policy judgment. Nonethe-
less, a similar requirement that ecolabels be based on "scientific 
methodology that is sufficiently thorough and comprehensive to 
support the claim and that produces results that are accurate 
and reproducible" is now circulating as part of ISO's ecolabelling 
principles.63 Operating through the TBT Agreement as stan-
dards adopted by an international standardizing body, 
ecolabelling principles adopted in ISO may very well require 
states to justify departures from those standards even though no 
consensus has been reached on the need for similar requirements 
among the member states of the intergovernmental WTO. 
Ecolabelling is but one example of a phenomenon that may 
have broader ramifications. While the long-term implications are 
not yet fully apparent, concerns about the effect of ISO standards 
on American public law are not merely theoretical. The interac-
tion between ISO standards and the Uruguay Round TBT Agree-
69 See, for example, Ben Wildavsky, Sticker Shock, Natl J 533 (Mar 9, 1996). 
110 See WT0 Doc WT/CTE/40 paras 66-81 (Nov 7, 1996) (report ofWTO Committee on 
Trade and Environment). 
•• See generally Community Nutrition Institute, Environmental Labeling in the Trade 
& Environment Contut (draft, Oct 1996); National Wildlife Federation, Guarding the 
Green Choice: Environmental Labeling and the Rights of Green Consumers (1996). 
•~ See U.S. Declines to Present Ecolabeling Proposal to WTO Committee, Inside US 
Trade 12 (July 26, 1996). 
6.1 Environmental Labelling-General Principles, ISO Doc ISOtrC 207/SC S, para 4.4 
(1997) (draft international standard ISO/DIS 14020). 
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ment, as demonstrated by recent developments on ecolabelling, 
may turn out to be highly corrosive for domestic governance. 
B. Legislative Procedures 
The status of post-World War II trade agreements in domes-
tic law is somewhat unusual. Congress has the exclusive authori-
ty under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate for-
eign trade. However, under Article II, Section 2, the President 
has the exclusive power to negotiate international agreements 
with foreign sovereigns. Presumably to dovetail these two func-
tions, Congress, in recent decades, has authorized the President 
to negotiate trade agreements by prior statute, within certain 
broad parameters, on the condition that those agreements do not 
enter into force until given effect by Congress through subse-
quent implementing legislation. Some have suggested that this 
"Congressional-Executive" process illegally bypasses the constitu-
tional requirement for the Senate to give its advice and consent 
to ratification of treaties by a two-thirds majority,64 but this ap-
pears to be a minority view. 
One important feature of the domestic process is that the 
implementing legislation for the GATr Uruguay Round, NAFTA, 
and other recent trade agreements is adopted under procedures 
commonly known as the "fast track." Under this process, once the 
implementing legislation is introduced, no amendments are per-
mitted, contrary to ordinary procedure in Congress. 66 The no-
amendment rule is designed to prevent Congress from effectively 
renegotiating or undermining the agreement by second-guessing 
the President's decisions in the negotiation on a case-by-case, 
individual basis. Nonetheless, there is a process that duplicates 
the normal legislative process to a certain extent. Under the fast 
track procedures, the text of the trade agreement proper is pub-
licly available before congressional consideration of the domestic 
legislation for implementing that international instrument. Con-
gress can, and in the case of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA 
did, hold public hearings on the agreements and, by implication, 
the legislation to implement it as a domestic legal matter. Mem-
64 See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University, to 
Senator Robert Byrd (July 19, 1994), reprinted in Inside US Trade 1 (July 22, 1994) 
(arguing that "the legal regime put in place by the Uruguay Round represents a structur-
al rearrangement of state-federal relations of the sort that requires ratification by two 
thirds of the Senate as a Treaty"). 
60 19 usc§§ 2191(d), 2903 (1994). 
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hers of Congress had confidential access to the draft bills and 
even participated in closed "non-markups" and "non-conferences" 
before the bills were formally introduced. 
Even so, the domestic implementing procedures have exacer-
bated, rather than improved, the lack of public access to the 
trade agreement negotiation process discussed in Part III below. 
The "non-markup" and "non-conference" processes are strictly 
closed to the public and in practice quite impenetrable. Certain 
congressional committees have preferential access to this process. 
In the case of NAFTA, the voluminous implementing legislation, 
which contained a large number of modifications to domestic U.S. 
law, was formally released to the public less than two weeks 
before the House of Representatives voted on the bill. Even then, 
this documentation was not readily available until somewhat 
later. The Executive Branch released the final version of an envi-
ronmental analysis of NAFTA to the public a scant four days 
before the House vote. · 
Some have defended the fast track process as duplicating all 
the essential elements of our democratic procedures.66 Whether 
or not that might be true in some cases, NAFTA certainly showed 
how the fast track approach can significantly disrupt the legisla-
tive process. The fast track process as a whole and the no-amend-
ment rule in particular are expressly designed to affect numerous 
laws simultaneously and to invite a particularly unprincipled sort 
of horse-trading among issues such as the safety of imported food 
and intellectual property that would rarely be so closely linked in 
a typical legislative session. The implementing legislation for the 
Uruguay Round made significant and controversial changes to 
the terms of patents.87 The same statute relaxed the test for the 
inspection by foreign states of poultry imported into the United 
States, from requiring "the same" standards as apply domestical-
ly to allowing standards that produce "sanitary protection equiva-
lent to that achieved under United States standards,lt66 and 
made similar changes that arguably will attenuate the rigor of 
inspection of foreign meat intended for U.S. consumers.69 These 
amendments to the patent and food inspection laws, along with 
any number of other components of the implementing legislation, 
68 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Policy, 18 
Brooklyn J Inti L 143 (1992). 
67 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 632(a)(1), Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 
4983-85 (1994), amending 35 USC§ 154 (1994). 
68 Id § 431(k) at 4969·70, amending 21 USC § 466 (1994). 
69 Id § 431(1) at 4970, amending 21 USC § 620(e) (1994). 
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represented major public policy initiatives that ought to have 
received a full domestic airing. Instead, these proposals were 
bundled in a trade agreement negotiation, which is extremely 
difficult for members of the public to penetrate on both the do-
mestic and international levels, as described in Part III below. 
Moreover, the shape of the legislative debate has already been 
predetermined well in advance by the Executive Branch, during 
the negotiation of the trade agreement proper. 
The fast track no-amendment rule, instead of ameliorating 
these impediments to full participation through an open process, 
exacerbates those obstacles for those public policy matters that, 
by happenstance or design, get caught up in the trade agreement 
negotiation process. The no-amendment rule would thus seem to 
be least-and not most-appropriate to situations involving om-
nibus legislation adopted to implement a trade agreement. 
C. Administrative Procedures 
Dispute settlement under the auspices of an international 
trade agreement poses unique difficulties in interweaving the 
results of an international adjudication and domestic regulatory 
procedures. A recent WTO panel proceeding on reformulated 
gasoline in the WTO-the first in that body and, not coincidental-
ly, yet another major juncture in the trade-and-environment 
debate-presents the general case in microcosm. 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act,70 the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA"), in late 1993, promulgated rules concerning 
"reformulated" gasoline, which reduces ground-level ozone in 
highly polluted areas. 71 The rules specify the composition of re-
formulated gasoline and require reductions in the emissions of 
certain pollutants. The EPA's regulation requires domestic refin-
ers that were in operation for at least six months in 1990 to 
establish an individual baseline, reflecting that refiner's actual 
historical performance, for determining compliance with the regu-
latory requirements. Domestic refiners in effect may c4oose one 
of three specified methods of calculation set out in the regula-
tions. Other entities, including foreign refiners, are assigned a 
baseline specified in the Act. At the same time, the statute and 
regulations require that conventional gasoline sold in the rest of 
70 42 usc § 7545(k) (1994). 
71 Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Stan-
dards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed Reg 7715, 7789 (Feb 16, 1994). 
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the country remain as clean as it was in 1990. Similar to the 
situation for reformulated gasoline, in cases in which a refiner's 
historical baseline cannot be calculated for conventional gasoline, 
a default statutory baseline is assigned as a benchmark against 
which subsequent performance is measured. While the different 
methods of calculating baselines for reformulated gasoline expire 
at the beginning of 1998, differences in the methodology for cal-
culating baselines for conventional gasoline will persist thereaf-
ter. 
The Venezuelan national oil company, Petroleos de Venezue-
la, S.A. ("PDVSA"), protested that the EPA rules discriminate 
against imported gasoline in contravention of the GATI. Appar-
ently in response, the EPA, in May 1994, published a proposed 
amendment to its reformulated gasoline regulations to address 
these complaints.72 In an appropriations measure, however, 
Congress prohibited the EPA from expending funds to finalize 
the proposed rule.73 . The subsequent challenge by Brazil and 
Venezuela to the merits of the existing reformulated and conven-
tional gasoline regulations was consequently the subject of the 
first dispute settlement panel established under the auspices of 
the WTO. Both the dispute settlement paneF4 and the WTO's 
Appellate Body76 ruled against the United States. After the re-
lease of the WTO Appellate Body's report, the EPA published a 
notice requesting that the public identify options for domestic 
compliance with that determination and supply data concerning 
the way various alternatives will affect the environment and 
public health.78 'The Agency then promulgated proposed77 and 
final rules7s revising the requirements for imported gasoline in a 
manner intended to implement the WTO ruling. 
This situation illustrates the difficulties inherent in resolving 
international trade disputes through the regulatory process even 
73 Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Individ-
ual Foreign Refinery Baseline Requirements for Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed Reg 22800 
(May 3, 1994). 
73 Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Inde-
pendent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub L No 103-327, 108 Stat 2298, 2322 (1994). 
7
• United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 ILM 
276, 300 (1996) (panel report). 
76 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 ILM 
603, 611 (1996) (report ofWI'O Appellate Body). See Steve Charnovitz, New WTO Adjudi-
cation and Its Implications for the Environment, 19 Inti Envir Rptr (BNA) 851 (1996). 
78 Environmental Protection Agency, World Trade Organization Decision on Gasoline 
Rule, 61 Fed Reg 33703 (June 28, 1996). 
77 62 Fed Reg 24776 (May 6, 1997). 
78 62 Fed Reg 45533 (Aug 28, 1997). 
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in apparently simple cases. Certain instrumentalities of the Unit-
ed States Government, and in particular the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, appear to have been engaged in 
ongoing discussions with entities of the Government of Venezuela 
concerning subsequent aspects of the resolution of this dispute, 
presumably including, of necessity, the outcome of the regulatory 
process underway at the EPA. 79 
As a practical matter, ongoing negotiations with the Govern-
ment of Venezuela make sense. Factoring the Venezuelans' needs 
and preferences into a revision of the regulatory requirements 
could have a beneficial effect on foreign relations between the 
United States and Venezuela and could avoid needlessly rein-
vigorating the trade dispute through a regulatory amendment 
that is not responsive to the foreign government's interests. From 
the point of view of GATTIWTO law and jurisprudence, ongoing 
consultations also have much to recommend them. The trade 
agreement dispute settlement process in principle is intended to 
facilitate mediation or conciliation of trade disputes, and dispute 
settlement panels are not wholly analogous to domestic courts 
acting in a strictly adjudicatory capacity. To that end, Article 
XXII(l) of GATT, which is a binding international legal obliga-
tion of the United States, expressly specifies that each WTO 
member "shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall 
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such 
representations as may be made by another [WTO member] with 
respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agree-
ment."80 
At the same time, there are entirely legitimate concerns 
about the way such consultations might distort the regulatory 
process. The United States and the Government of Venezuela are 
parties to a formal dispute in the WTO. Subsequent regulatory 
79 See, for example, Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. to Honor Trade Ruling Against It on 
Foreign Fuel, NY Times D4 (June 29, 1996); US, Venezuela Agree to Phase Out Reformu-
lated Gas Rules Ouer 15 Months, Inti Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec 4, 1996) (reporting in 
discussions between USTR and entities of Venezuelan government). So far as can be 
determined from the dockets for both rulemakings, initiated by notices of proposed 
rulemaking in 1994 and 1997 respectively, relevant conversations between EPA employ-
ees and Venezuelan governmental authorities appear in the record. It is by no means 
clear, however, that oral communications between staffers of other agencies, including in 
particular USTR, and Venezuelan authorities were similarly docketed. See note 88 (dis-
cussing docketing requirements for "conduit" communications transmitted via other 
agencies). 
110 General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Oct 30, 194 7, Art XXII, 55 UNTS 188 
(1950). 
358 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997: 
actions, as is made clear by the EPA's Federal Register notices, 
were intended to serve as vehicles for resolving this intergovern-
mental dispute.81 Absent objective evidence to the contrary, one 
should assume that such discussions have the adversarial quali-
ties characteristic of "settlement" negotiations in general. In such 
a situation, back-channel negotiations with foreign governments 
might well subvert the integrity of the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process and could serve as an invitation to compro-
mise statutory standards. WTO reports have no binding force 
under domestic law.82 For federal authorities to determine the 
outcome of a rulem'aking that has yet to take place or that is 
underway in the context of settlement negotiations with a foreign 
government would be inappropriate, if not illegal. The House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, which held hearings on 
this matter, articulated precisely this fear by observing that "the 
State Department had made commitments regarding the rule to 
the Venezuelans which made the public participation require-
ments of the [Clean Air Act] ineffective.,as 
In situations such as this one in which regulatory decisions 
are intended to implement outcomes in trade agreement dispute 
settlement reports adverse to the United States, communications 
with the complainant government may constitute ex parte con-
tacts.84 While the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits such 
ex parte communications in formal adjudications and formal 
rulemakings, it does not speak to ex parte contacts in informal 
rulemakings. Neither does Section 307 of the Clean Air Act, the 
provision establishing rulemaking procedures that apply to the 
reformulated gasoline regulations. But perhaps not so fortuitous-
ly, the leading case on ex parte contacts in an informal 
81 Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel Concerning U.S. Standards for Refor· 
mulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed Reg 52034 (Oct 13, 1994); WTO Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings Concerning Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 60 Fed Reg 
19422 (Apr 18, 1995). 
82 See, for example, Statement of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States Trade 
Representative (Jan 18, 1996) (responding to initial WTO panel report on reformulated 
and conventional gasoline, noting that "WTT panel reports have no force under U.S. Law. 
In particular, federal agencies are not bound by any finding or recommendations included 
in WTO panel reports, and such reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies 
to change their regulations or procedures"). 
83 Report on the Activity of the Committee on Energy and Commerce for the 103d 
Congress, HR Rep No 882, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 278 (1994). 
84 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 551(14) (defining "ex parte communication" 
as "an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which rea-
sonable prior notice to all parties is not given"). 
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rulemaking setting, Sierra Club v Costle,86 arose under Section 
307. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, reaffirming earlier precedents, noted 
that ex parte contacts are prohibited in an informal rulemaking 
involving "conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege. "86 
This constraint is of constitutional dimension, originating in the 
due process clause. In other informal rulemakings that are less 
adjudicatory and more policy-oriented, ex parte contacts are per-
mitted but must be docketed in summary form if they are of 
"central relevance" to the administrative proceeding.87 
Some aspects of the reformulated gasoline situation may be 
controlled by the technical parameters articulated by earljer 
precedent, such as Sierra Club v Costle.88 The policy setting, 
however, appears to be a case of first impression that is, more-
over, highly likely to recur as regulatory actions become the sub-
ject matter of trade agreement challenges. Administrative actions 
taken in such settings will necessarily be in response to a formal, 
intergovernmental dispute resolved through a quasi-adjudicatory, 
third-party mechanism that the United States has already lost. 
Although formally cast as a dispute between states, such contro-
versies can have significant impacts on private parties and strong 
commercial overtones. Discussions with representatives of the 
complainant government will very likely have the character of 
settlement negotiations between parties to an adversarial, adjudi-
catory proceeding. While the WTO's adverse panel and Appellate 
Body reports have no binding legal character of their own force 
domestically, they can catalyze a realignment of domestic inter-
ests, generate considerable policy pressure, and give rise to rights 
se 657 F2d 298 (DC Cir 1981). 
86 Id at 400, quoting Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v United States, 269 F2d 221, 
224 (DC Cir 1959). 
87 Id at 402. 
88 Id. Existing precedent is less than comprehensive on some key questions that may 
arise in this situation. For example, the court in Sierra Club v Castle did not reach the 
question of the need to document oral interagency communications other than with the 
President, see id at 404-09, or "conduit" communications in which Executive Branch offi-
cials transmit the views of private parties, see id at 405 n 520, both of which are likely to 
be relevant in this context. In the trade agreement situation, the uncertain state of the 
law as set out in Sierra Club v Castle may well have perverse effect. The docketing re-
quirement could constrain the capacity of the agency whose regulation was challenged, 
the EPA in the case of the reformulated gasoline rule, from obtaining useful information. 
At the same time, other agencies, especially those engaged in the conduct of international 
relations such as the State Department and USTR, may well have unfettered license to 
communicate directly with the complainant government, potentially increasing the lever-
age of those agencies in influencing the outcome of any subsequent regulatory proceeding. 
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and responsibilities in the international legal system. Adminis-
trative actions taken in such situations are thus likely to fall into 
neither of the categories articulated in Sierra Club v Costle: ei-
ther "conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege," on the 
one hand, or generic policymaking, on the other.89 Although 
rulemakings undertaken to comply with the rulings of domestic 
courts are not uncommon, administrative actions in response to 
an adverse trade agreement panel report are unusual, if not 
unprecedented, in the health and environmental field as a re-
sponse to an international third party dispute settlement process 
whose action has no domestic legal force. Such a situation may 
call for particular sensitivity to the need to preserve the integrity 
of domestic administrative procedures in a setting that, of neces-
sity, also has international overtones. 
D. Judicial Review 
As in the case of administrative proceedings, adverse t~ade 
agreement dispute settlement panel reports challenge the integri-
ty of judicial review. It is well established that adverse reports of 
WTO and NAFI'A dispute settlement panels cannot repeal feder-
al statutes.90 Statutory law, however, is but one component of 
the regulatory process. Most federal environmental statutes re-
quire subsequent implementation through administrative 
rulemaking or other Executive Branch action. In this realm of 
Executive Branch prerogative, there may be little or nothing to 
keep the Executive from unilaterally relaxing a domestic stan-
dard in response to an adverse trade agreement dispute settle-
ment panel report such as that on reformulated gasoline dis-
cussed in Part II.C. And because of the "negative" character of 
trade agreements, the change will always reduce the rigor of 
domestic regulatory requirements. 
In such a case, the courts and the institution of judicial re-
view may provide the only meaningful remedy to assure that the 
Executive Branch satisfies both substantive and procedural do-
mestic statutory criteria. However, in federal court a controversy 
like the reformulated gasoline rule described in the previous Part 
appears not only as an ordinary regulation in a garden-variety 
proceeding for judicial review, but also as a foreign relations 
89 657 F2d at 402. 
110 Compare note 93 (discussing domestic legal force of adverse reports of trade agree· 
ment dispute settlement panels). 
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issue. After an earlier, adverse panel ruling in the tuna dolphin 
controversy, discussed in greater detail in Part III below, the 
Executive Branch did not hesitate to emphasize the potential 
harm to foreign relations, notwithstanding the lack of legal force 
to the earlier determination, if the court were to rule against the 
government on a question of statutory interpretation.91 It is 
axiomatic that the courts are much more receptive to such ap· 
peals . from the Executive Branch in a foreign. relations setting-
than in a domestic context.92 Such arguments can create a seri· 
ous dilemma for some judges, who can be understandably wary of 
taking actions that by judicial fiat will preclude the other branch· 
es of government from fulfilling the international legal commit· 
ments of the United States.93 
91 Robert F. Housman and Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and 
Trade: The GAIT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 Envir L Rptr 10268 (1992). 
While the [Executive Branch] did not argue that the court was legally bound by 
the Panel's decision in interpreting the intermediary embargo nation provisions 
of the [U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act), the government did go to great 
lengths to make the court aware of the Panel's decision. Implicit in this effort to 
present the court with the Panel's decision was the notion that the court should 
be aware of, and consider in its decision, the effects of its decision on foreign 
trade relations. The United States pointed to the Panel's decision as evidence of 
the substantial friction that could result from a more stringent reading of the in-
termediary nations embargo provisions of the MMPA. 
ld at 10274. 
92 See, for example, Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 
71 (Columbia 1990) (noting "sometimes extravagant judicial interpretations of statutes in 
order to support a conclusion that a questionable executive act was done by authority of 
Congress"); Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions, Judicial .An8wers: Does the Rule of 
Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton 1992). 
93 This situation in some ways is analogous to that of S<H:alled •sole" executive agree-
ments concluded with foreign states by the President without Senate advice and consent. 
to ratification, as specified in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, or other explicit 
congressional authorization. Executive agreements that do not have clear legal authority, 
either in statute or a treaty mtified after Senate advice and consent, have an uncertain 
legal force. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 115 (1987). Although possible as a matter of principle, the number of instances in which 
courts have invalidated executive agreements as inconsistent with statutory law is very 
small. See, for example, United States v Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F2d 655 (4th Cir 1953), 
afl'd on other grounds, 348 US 296 (1955) (invalidating executive agreement as inconsis-
tent with statute); Swearingen v United States, 565 F Supp 1019 (D Colo 1983) (same). 
The situation with respect to trade agreement dispute settlement panel reports, however, 
is quite different from that pertaining to executive agreements. For one, the domestic 
legal status of such reports is much more clearly settled than that of executive agree-
ments. For another, most international trade agreements anticipate the payment of 
compensation as an alternative means of delivering on the obligations in those agree-
ments if the offending measure cannot be removed. See, for example, Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr 15, 1994, Art 22, Uru-
guay Round Finl!l Act, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 
31, 33 ILM 1226 (1994) (Uruguay Round instrument addressing compensation and sus-
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An earlier series of judicial proceedings clearly demonstrates 
the potential for difficulties when questions of statutory interpre-
tation and the integrity of agency regulatory process appear in a 
foreign relations context. In the mid-1980s, the EPA, acting on 
evidence that the fumigant ethylene dibromide ("EDB") causes 
cancer, genetic mutations, and adverse reproductive effects in 
human beings, banned that pesticide for use on domestic pro-
duce. In contrast, in response to assertions from the Department 
of State that the ban would damage the economies of friendly 
exporting countries, the EPA promulgated a regulation or "toler-
ance" that continued to allow residues of 30 parts per billion 
("ppb") of EDB in imported mangoes. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the toler-
ance, concluding that, because the EPA was required by statute 
to base pesticide residue limitations on health considerations, the 
agency's reliance on foreign affairs concerns alone was illegal. 94 
On remand, the EPA reaffirmed the residue limitation for 
imported mangoes, but came up with new justifications for that 
tolerance.96 The Agency concluded that the special exemption 
was warranted by ongoing cooperative efforts with food-exporting 
nations to assure that fruit and vegetables enter the United 
States free of disease, of pests such as the Mediterranean frui.tfly, 
and of unsafe levels of pesticides.96 Moreover, mango-producing 
nations were channeling export revenues into the search for 
alternatives to EDB. Accordingly, the EPA concluded that revok-
ing the EDB tolerance and prohibiting the importation of contam-
inated mangoes into the United States would pose greater risks 
to the food supply than continuing to allow the entry of the pes-
pension of concessions in cases of unimplemented dispute settlement panel reports). See 
generally William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Inti L J 51, 60 
(1988). An approach that suggests the potential for disrupting domestic regulatory 
schemes in the implementation of adverse tmde agreement dispute settlement panel 
reports was prefigured by the Supreme Court in Japan Whaling Assn v American Ceta· 
cean Society, 478 US 221 (1986). That case involved a question of statutory interpretation, 
the outcome of which also determined the validity of an existing executive agreement with 
Japan. The Court applied a Chevron-style deference analysis to the question of statutory 
interpretation, thereby avoiding the potential conflict between the statute and the 
agreement, but also arguably contorting the statutory intent. See David A Wirth, A 
Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American Environmental Law, 
32 Va J Inti L 377 (1992). 
94 National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v Thomas, 809 F2d 875, 883 
CDC Cir 1987). 
96 National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticicks v Thomas, 815 F2d 1579, 1582 
CDC Cir 1987). 
96 Id at 1581. 
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ticide-laced produce.97 To put it kindly, this reasoning is 
counterintuitive. Nonetheless, after the EPA provided assurances 
that the standard for imported mangoes was only temporary, the 
Court of Appeals accepted this rationalization and approved the 
very same tolerance that it had previously set aside as a viola-
tion of the statutory standard.98 Although the D.C. Circuit's sec-
ond review of the mango tolerance was phrased as a pure ques-
tion of statutory interpretation of the health-based standard in 
the governing statute, the court could hardly have been deaf to 
the Government's clear assertions of harm to foreign relations. 
As this example shows, such "internationalization" may be 
unhealthy for the democratic decisionmaking process.99 With 
international trade agreements, the situation could easily be 
corrected by including in the domestic implementing legislation 
an express statement that the conclusions of dispute settlement 
panel reports shall be entirely without legal effect in administra-
tive or judicial proceedings. Without such guarantees, there is a 
considerable risk that the Executive Branch will act unilaterally 
with few if any restrictions, either from the legislative or judicial 
branches, in areas of domestic jurisdiction that happen to fall 
within the purview of international trade ·agreements. Such a 
provision, moreover, would be entirely consistent with the princi-
ple that dispute settlement panel reports lack domestic legal 
effect. Of course, Congress could always act to overturn a regula-
tion that did not conform to the expectations of a dispute settle-
ment panel constituted under an international trade agreement. 
Such a check, which in effect establishes the Congress as the 
forum for settling such trade disputes, is highly desirable to as-
sure multibranch action on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment, to guarantee adequate public access to domestic 
decisionmaking processes in areas affected by the actions of mul-
tilateral trade bodies, and to counterbalance to the considerable 
aggrandizement of unilateral .Executive Branch power otherwise 
fostered by the domestic implementation of international trade 
agreements. 
91 ld. 
98 Id at 1582. 
99 Compare Turley, Dualistic Values at 262-70 (cited in note 45) (criticizing presump-
tion in favor of international law). 
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E. Federal-State Relations 
Another major structural issue is the manner in which the 
WTO, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round agreements affect state 
and federal law. These agreements have not just the potential, 
but the strong likelihood, of disrupting federal-state relationships 
by "federalizing" issues that were previously the prerogatives of 
the states. 
A report published in 1994 by the European Union100 em-
phasizes how much is at stake. That report explicitly targets a 
number of federal and state-level environmental and public 
health requirements as non-tariff barriers to trade. Of particular 
concern are state laws that may have more stringent environ-
mental and public health standards than federal statutes or 
regulations. Presumably as a consequence, during the debate 
over the Uruguay Round implementing legislation, forty-four 
state attorneys general wrote to the President requesting what 
they described as a summit meeting on this issue.101 
Because of concerns such as these, the implementing legisla-
tion for both the Uruguay Round102 and NAFTA103 establishes 
a federal-state consultation process in the event of a dispute initi-
ated by one of the other parties to the agreement challenging the 
law of a state or any of its political subdivisions. illtimately, 
however, that implementing legislation, like that for other trade 
agreements before it, preserves judicial remedies for federal au-
thorities to sue state governments to compel compliance with 
trade agreements and actions taken under them. 104 Of course, 
in a federal state like the United States, there must be a mecha-
nism to assure that subsidiary governmental units such as the 
states in the U.S. and the provinces in Canada observe interna-
tional law. However, the real question is the form of that mecha-
nism, consistent with our notions of federalism and preemp-
tion.105 In the pesticide area, for instance, the states may take 
100 European Union, Report on United States Barriers to 1'radl! and Investment (1994). 
101 State Groups, Lawmakers Oppose Pre· Emption Of State Law Under GA'IT, 11 Inti 
Trade Rep (BNA) 1136 (1994). 
102 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(bX1), Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 
4815-17 (1994). 
100 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 102(bX1), Pub L 103· 
182, 107 Stat 2057, 2062-63 (1993). 
104 See notes 102 and 103. 
105 Even in the absence of specific legislation, state courts have interpreted the GATT, 
operating through the Supremacy and Foreign Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, to pre· 
empt state and local initiatives. See, for example, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v Board of Com-
missioners of the Department of Water & Power of the City of Los Angeles, 276 Cal App 2d 
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certain actions that are more stringent than provided in federal 
law.106 
An entirely viable alternative to allowing the Executive 
Branch to extinguish these rights by judicial action would be to 
preserve the full autonomy of subsidiary governmental units 
after the agreement enters into effect. Then, if a problem were to 
arise concerning implementation at the state or local level, the 
Executive Branch could negotiate with those bodies. If those 
negotiations were to fail, special legislation preempting the rights 
of the state in question on a particular issue could be adopted by 
Congress, specially tailored to that problem situation. This is yet 
another area in which trade agreements unnecessarily serve to 
expand Executive Branch power, in this case at the expense of 
the states. The inclusion of Congress in the implementation pro-
cess is highly desirable as an additional forum in which to debate 
the merits of any adverse dispute settlement panel report and 
the form of compliance by the United States. Otherwise, we may 
have no way of even knowing what we are giving up at the 
subnationallevel if virtually any state or local law, regulation, or 
ordinance can be "federalized" through the avenue of a trade 
agreement. 
III. GoVERNANCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Purely on the international level, the processes and proce-
dures set out in international trade agreements and implemented 
in such settings as the WTO also raise significant concerns that 
might be characterized as falling within the realm of "good gover-
nance." While there is no legal impediment to the United States 
becoming a party to international trade agreements and partici-
pating in activities organized under the auspices of those agree-
ments, there is nonetheless a powerful "cognitive dissonance"' 
between, on the one hand, our domestic legal traditions of open-
221 (1969) ("Buy American" law); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v Superior Court, 208 
Cal App 2d 803 (1962) (same); Territory of Hawaii v Ho, 41 Haw 565 (1957) (labeling law). 
There is no real question concerning the legal capacity of an international agreement tc• 
affect the distribution of authority between the federal government and the states. See,, 
for example, United States v Pink, 315 US 203 (1942) (domestic legal effect of executiVE! 
agreement recognizing government of Soviet Union); United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 
(1937) (same); Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920) (Article II, Section 2 treaty can 
effect redistribution of federal and state power even if statute on same subject matter 
could not). Rather, the issue here is one of policy. See De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351 (1976) 
(states and subsidiary governmental units may take actions with impacts on foreign 
relations law if Congress declines to preempt their capacity to do so). 
106 See, for example, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US 597 (1991). 
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ness and accountability and, on the other, the very closed policies 
pertaining to negotiation and implementation adopted under 
these agreements. When a subject of domestic regulatory activity, 
such as food safety or reformulated gasoline, is addressed in a 
trade agreement setting, the public policy debate in effect is relo-
cated to a forum in which the public has significantly less input 
in making and adjudicating the law than on the domestic level. 
While it is unreasonable to expect multilateral trade agreements 
to fully mirror the minutiae of every legal system on Earth, it is 
also important to preserve the core values of municipal legal 
systems through which the expectations of international trade 
agreements are implemented. 
A. Lawmaking Through International Trade Agreements 
Negotiating trade agreements such as the GATT Uruguay 
Round and NAFTA is clearly a lawmaking activity, on both the 
international and national levels. Only states as represented by 
their governments may participate in multilateral WTO negotia-
tions. The public generally does not have direct access to law-
making in the WTO, either in the form of presence at negotiating 
sessions, such as the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, or 
public availability of interim negotiating drafts.107 As a result of 
complaints about such exclusions, the WTO recently released a 
policy governing relations with non-governmental organiza-
tions.108 While generally encouraging greater communication 
with members of the public as a desirable goal, that instrument 
in effect reaffirmed the status quo: 
As a result of extensive discussions, there ·is currently a 
broadly held view that it would not be possible for 
NGOs [non-governmental organizations] to be directly 
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer 
consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be 
met constructively through appropriate processes at the 
national level where lies primary responsibility for 
taking into account the different elements of public 
107 See Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Contracting Parties, GATT BISD 12th 
Supp 11 (1964) (limiting observers to governments and intergovernmental organizations). 
108 Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, 
WTO Doc WTIU160 (July 18, 1996). 
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interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-mak-
ing.t09 
367 
Many other international organizations are, by contrast, far more 
open in their dealings with the public.110 · 
Notwithstanding the optimism of the WTO with respect to 
the alternative of national legal and policy channels, domestic 
points of public access in the United States to the negotiation of 
trade agreements are few. Compared with familiar legislative 
and administrative law-making processes, those opportunities 
that do exist provide considerably less notice and information to 
the public. Representative Gephardt tellingly described the draft-
ing process for NAFTA as "the most secretive trade negotiations 
that I have ever monitored."111 The Executive Branch did not 
release interim texts of NAFTA. Indeed, when a document pur-
porting to be a draft of the agreement was leaked to the press in 
late March 1992, the Executive Branch would neither confirm 
nor deny the authenticity of that document.112 Although the 
GA'IT secretariat itself released an interim negotiating text/13 
the Uruguay Round negotiations were similarly closed to the 
public. 
A web of statutorily created private sector advisory commit-
tees, including a Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Com-
mittee,114 designed to provide private sector input to the United 
States Trade Representative ("USTR") is less than fully satisfac-
tory as a conduit for public access to the trade agreement negoti-
ation process. Subsidiary policy advisory committees are exempt 
by statute from specified statutory requirements for open 
109 ld. 
110 See, for example, David A Wirth, Public Participation in International Processes: 
Environmental Case Studies at the National and International Level, 7 Colo J Intl Envir L 
& Pol 1 (Winter 1996). 
111 Remarks of Representative Richard Gephardt Before the 21st Century Conference, 
Washington D.C. (Sept 9, 1992). 
112 Citizen Groups Say Leaked NAFTA Draft Would Undermine U.S. Standards, lntl 
Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar 26, 1992). Although there was a dialogue with environmental 
organizations during the negotiation of the so-called "environmental side agreement" to 
NAFTA, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept 8-14, 1993, 32 
ILM 1482 (1993) ("NEAAC"), interim drafts of that instrument also were not released to 
the public. In any event, the side agreement does not modify the basic NAFTA text. 
113 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc MTN TNC/W/FA (Dec 20, 1991) ("Dunkel Draft"). 
114 The President established a new Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Commit-
tee ("TEPAC") by executive order on March 25, 1994. Executive Order No 12,905, 3 CFR 
880 (1994). The TEPAC is part of the larger private sector trade advisory committee 
structure established by statute. 
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meetings, public notice, public participation, and public availabil-
ity of documents under certain circumstances. 115 A recent law-
suit116 established that the USTR had interpreted these restric-
tions in an excessively broad manner so as to further constrict 
public access through this channel. Even after that case, the 
members of the subsidiary policy advisory committees, along with 
one additional staffer for each committee who may also have 
access to interim negotiating texts, are subject to confidentiality 
restrictions authorized by the statute creating those advisory 
committees.117 These confidentiality agreements, among other 
things, prohibit the signatory from releasing the text to the pub-
lic or to other individuals within the individual's own organiza-
tion. 
While perhaps somewhat sensitive from a strategic point of 
view, trade negotiations on such questions as food safety are not 
fundamentally issues of national security. The Executive Branch, 
which represents the United States in the WTO and other trade 
negotiations, has considerable discretion to make interim drafts 
and other documentation available to its own public. As more 
and more domestic regulatory issues concerning environment and 
public health become "internationalized" through trade agree-
ments, as they have, it is only reasonable to expect a degree of 
openness and accountability commensurate with the political and 
legal culture surrounding those issues domestically. If the Execu-
tive Branch does not undertake such an initiative on its own, 
then Congress, which has the exclusive, expressly enumerated 
constitutional authority to regulate international trade, 116 ought 
to address the need by statute. 
m 19 USC § 2155(0(2) (1994) (Exempting policy advisory committees from certain 
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act "whenever and to the extent it is 
determined J:>y the President or his designee that such meetings will be concerned with 
matters the disclosure of which would seriously compromise the development by the 
United States Government of trade policy, priorities, negotiating objectives or bargaining 
positions .... "). 
116 Public Citizen v Barshefsky, 939 F Supp 31, 37 (D DC 1996). 
111 19 USC § 2155(gX3). The statutory language requires that rules issued by the 
Executive Branch "shall, to the maximum extent feasible, permit meaningful oonsulta· 
tions by advisory committee members with persons affected by [trade agreements]." 
118 See Part II.B. 
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B. Dispute Settlement Procedures in International TradE! 
Agreements 
Another serious international problem concerns public partic-
ipation in dispute settlement in the WTO, under NAFI'A, and in 
other trade agreements.119 The history of the tuna dolphin dis-
pute with Mexico in the GATI is a good example of the signifi-
cant disjunction between domestic and international processes on 
very similar issues that revolve around the same set of facts. 
This dispute involved a provision of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act ("MMPA")/20 a statute enacted in 1972121 and 
amended in major respects in 1984122 and 1988,123 but neve1r 
fully implemented by the Executive Branch. The statute essen-
tially requires that the kill of dolphin by foreign fleets incidental 
to fishing for yellowfin tuna with "purse-seine" nets be commen-
surate with that of the United States fleet. The remedy for fail-
ing to meet this standard is trade restrictions on imports of tuna 
from the offending country. The Earth Island Institute and tht~ 
Marine Mammal Fund, two private nonprofit organizations, sued 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California under a theory of judicial review and obtained a court 
order directing the Executive Branch to carry out itl3 
nondiscretionary duties under the MMPA by imposing a ban on 
imports of yellowfin tuna from Mexico and other countries. 124 
The Executive Branch then applied an administrative regula-
tion126 that was promulgated by the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration ("NOAA"), located in the Department 
of Commerce, and adopted after notice-and-comment.126 Relying-
119 Domestic legal and policy questions surrounding the trade agreement dispute 
settlement process are discussed in Part II above. 
120 16 usc§ 1371 (1982). 
121 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-522, 86 Stat 1027. The 
House of Representatives held four days of public hearings on the bill that subsequently 
became the MMPA. See HR Rep No 92-707, 92d Cong, 2d Sese (1971), reprinted in 1972 
USCCAN 4144. 
122 Act to Authorize Appropriations to Carry Out the Marine Mammal Protection Ac:t 
of 1972, Pub L No 98-364,98 Stat 440 (1984). See HR Rep No 98-758, 98th Cong, 2d See:s 
(1984). 
123 Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub L No 100-711, 102 Stat 
4755. See HR Rep No 100-970, lOOth Cong, 2d Sess (1984). 
1u Earth Island Institute v Mosbacher, 746 F Supp 964 (ND Call990). 
·~ 50 CFR § 216.24(eX5)(iv)-(ix). 
128 NOAA initially published a proposed rule to implement the 1984 amendments on 
August 13, 1986. 51 Fed Reg 28963 (Aug 13, 1986). The comment period on this proposul 
was subsequently extended, in particular to give potentially affected foreign nations a full 
opportunity to comment. 51 Fed Reg 36568 (Oct 14, 1986). NOAA then published an 
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on that regulation, the National Marine Fisheries Service 
("NMFS") found that Mexico had satisfied the statutory standard 
and thus lifted the import prohibition. 127 Subsequently, the Dis-
trict Court issued a second order reaffirming the ban after con-
cluding that the regulation was inconsistent with the MMPA and 
therefore illegal. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both orders of the District 
Court.128 
Mexico initiated a dispute settlement process in GATT, chal-
lenging the import ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade. In con-
trast to the opportunities for public input into the judicial forums 
in which this dispute was treated on the domestic level, but con-
sistent with standard GATT procedures, the documents and oral 
proceedings in the case were not accessible to the public.129 Dis-
pute settlement in GATT does not provide for participation by 
private parties as intervenors or amici. The Earth Island 
Institute's lawyer, who had initiated the case on the domestic 
level, traveled to Geneva for the oral proceedings before the pan-
el, but was compelled to wait in the corridor while the panel 
heard arguments from representatives of the governments of 
Mexico and the United States. 
In this proceeding, however, ten other GATT parties and the 
European Economic Community made written submissions to the 
panel, all of which were critical of the MMPA ban and most of 
which argued that that action was inconsistent with the GATT. 
No other contracting parties to the GATT sided with the United 
States. Further, the United States was represented in the GATT 
dispute settlement process by the Executive Branch, which had 
flouted three statutory directives, adopted an illegal regulation, 
and reluctantly implemented the import ban only under court 
order. Particularly against the background of the closed nature of 
interim final rule in 1988. 53 Fed Reg 8911 (Mar 18, 1988). A second interim final rule 
with a request for comments, necessitated by the intervening amendments to the MMPA 
enacted in 1988, was promulgated in 1989. 54 Fed Reg 9438 (Mar 7, 1989). The final 
regulation published in March 1990 reflected comments on the 1989 interim final rule. 
121 Earth Island Institute u Mosbacher, 929 F2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir 1991). 
128 Id at 1449. 
129 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance, Annex § 6(iv), Nov 28, 1979, GATI' BISD 26th Supp 217 (1980) (stating that 
"written memoranda submitted to the panel have been considered confidential, but are 
made available to the parties to the dispute.") See also Improvements to the GA'IT 
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, April 12, 1989, GATI' BISD 36th Supp 61 
(1990) (referencing suggested working procedures establishing that submissions of parties 
to panels confidential and panel sessions closed). 
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the GATT process, questions about whether the Executive 
Branch vigorously defended the validity of the ban naturally 
arose. The inaccessibility of the proceedings to members of the 
public strongly suggests that important perspectives were not 
adequately presented to the GATT dispute settlement panel, at 
least as a formal matter. Although the Executive Branch solicited 
some input from certain members of the public in the preparation 
of its submission/30 those views, at most, affected only the 
United States submission to the panel, which in any event had to 
reflect the Government's position. While helpful, that practice 
cannot replace direct written and oral submissions. 
In short, the many entry points for the public in implement-
ing and adjudicating law on the national level are duplicated 
poorly if at all in the international trade regime. And as more 
and more domestic regulatory issues arise in an international 
trade setting, examples of these divergences will very likely in-
crease in number and frequency. The Uruguay Round relaxes the 
confidentiality requirements for the dispute settlement process 
somewhat, 131 but NAFI'A does not reflect even this newly estab-
lished, although still unsatisfactory, "good practice standard."132 
Under both agreements, there is still a strong chance that a 
dispute will be "removed" from a domestic forum to an interna-
tional one in which the procedural and participatory rights of 
interested private parties are attenuated if not altogether elim-
inated. 
It would be entirely feasible to allow private parties to sub-
mit additional statements or arguments to dispute settlement 
panels in a capacity similar to that of amicus curiae in domestic 
130 See Letter from Julius L. Katz, Deputy United States Trade Representative, to 
Justin Ward, Senior Resource Specialist, and AI Meyerhoff, Senior Attorney, Natural 
Resources Defense Council (Apr 17, 1992). 
131 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr 15, 1994, para 18.2, Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results 
of the Uruguay Round vol 31, 33 ILM 1226, 1237 (1994) (stating that "written submis· 
sions to the panel or the (newly created] Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, 
but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding 
shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statement (sic] of its own positions to 
the public. Members shall treat as. confidential, (sic] information submitted by another 
Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confi-
dential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confi-
dential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be 
disclosed to the public.") 
132 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, Art 2012, § 1(b), 32 ILM 
289 (1993) ("NAFTA") (stating that "the panel's hearings, deliberations and initial report, 
and all written submissions to and communications with the panel shall be confidential.") 
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law. If amicus status could be granted only after submission and 
approval of a written application, to which the states that are 
parties to the underlying case could respond, then the panel 
would have the authority to assure that there is no disruption to 
the orderly administration of justice. An application might be 
required to document the applicant's interest, the adequacy of 
representation of that interest by existing parties, the applicant's 
potential contribution to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute, 
the prejudice to the original parties if participation is permitted, 
and the scope of the proposed submission as amicus curiae. If the 
applicant is permitted to present a written submission, the panel 
could then decide the additional, distinct question of whether to 
hear the applicant during oral proceedings. Although as a matter 
of principle all written submissions to trade agreement dispute 
settlement panels ought to be made available to the public, as a 
second best alternative potential amici might be requested as a 
condition of participation to agree to keep documentation submit-
ted by governments confidential. Such proposals, if implemented, 
could be expected to substantially improve public access to the 
trade agreement dispute settlement process while leaving that 
process intact. 
CONCLUSION 
International trade agreements represent an opportunity to 
some and an enticement to others to accomplish substantive 
goals through international channels in the face of domestic im-
pediments to achieving those same aims at the national level. 
Certainly, this is a valid use of international pacts of all kinds, 
including both multilateral environmental treaties and interna-
tional trade agreements. Because of the lack of institutional and 
technical expertise resulting from a quite divergent mission, 
however, trade agreements, at least as currently structured, are 
poor candidates to serve as vehicles for facilitating regulatory 
reform of domestic public health and environmental regulation. 
For one, trade agreements address only a portion of the over-
all situation, namely the potential for abuse of regulatory mea-
sures, in isolation from the benefits of regulation. Even then, 
only adverse trade-related impacts are scrutinized; not economic, 
social, or other effects. The result is a high degree of asymmetry 
in the representation of social welfare considerations aside from 
trade. Trade agreements therefore provide little guidance for 
restructuring domestic or, indeed, international regulation so as 
to be more effective or even more efficient. In areas such as envi-
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ronmental protection and public health, questions of the scientific 
integrity and economic efficiency of domestic regulation are bet-
ter addressed in forums that are equipped with the technical 
capabilities needed to address with those issues. Further, serious 
questions of procedure and governance strongly suggest that, 
from the point of view of accountability and legitimacy as tradi-
tionally viewed in the United States, international trade agree-
ments are unsatisfactory arenas in which to formulate domestic 
regulatory policies. 
Consequently, deregulatory efforts undertaken in trade 
agreement forums should be exceptionally cautious. Indeed, there 
is much to suggest that such initiatives ought not to be attempt-
ed there at all. 
